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P.O. Box 1645
Idaho Falls, ID 83403
Attorneys for AppellantslPlaintiffs

Attorneys for DefendantsIRespondents as
indicated in the Certificate of Service

STATEMENT ON ORAL ARGUMENT
AppellantsIPlaintiffs respectfully request oral argument.

This appeal

involves an issue essential to the fair administration of justice in the State of Idaho
for the heirs of persons injured by the negligence of another who die from that
injury but who do not die within two years of that injury. In a question of law of
great significance to the jurisprudence of the state, this Court is called upon to
decide if Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute means what it says and whether this
Court's decision in Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 673
P.2d 385, 386 (1983), which holds unequivocally that the limitation period under
Idaho's wrongful death act begins on the date of the person's death and not the
date of the injury causing the death, is still the law in Idaho. A final determination
of this issue will have significant statewide impact for all personal injury claimants
and will therefore provide guidance to courts and future litigants regarding their
access to the courts of Idaho.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Whether the Trial Courts Erred in Granting the Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment on the Statute of Limitations in the Wrongful Death Claims.
11. Whether the Trial Courts' Rulings Deprive Idaho Citizens of Constitutional
Rights.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Nature of the Case.
In this consolidated appeal from two orders by two trial courts granting

summary judgment on the statute of limitations, the facts are not in dispute.
Wrongfbl death actions were brought by the heirs of John D. Stoor, Robert Branch,
Jr., William D. Frasure and John H. Adamson asserting that as a result of
continuous exposure to defendants' asbestos-containing materials and products
each contracted asbestos-related diseases and subsequently died from those
diseases.' The plaintiffs in each case filed suit alleging, among other causes of
action, wrongful death claims. Each lawsuit was filed within two years following
the date of the decedent's death although the decedents' were diagnosed with the
injuries causing death more than two years prior to filing suit. In motions for
summary judgment in each case, the defendants contended that the decedents had
no causes of action at the time of their deaths because, based on the application of
the condition precedent rule, their personal injury causes of action had expired
more than two years before they died. Plaintiffs contended that, based on the plain
language of Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute as well as a clear pronouncement
from this Court in Chapman v. Cavdiac Pacernakevs, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d
385 (Idaho 1983), a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the death of the
1

John D. Stoor, Robert Branch, Jr., William D. Frasure and John H. Adarnson are referred
to in this brief as "decedents."

injured party. Ultimately both trial courts granted the defendants' motions for
summary judgment having found that the plaintiffs' wrongful death causes of
action were barred by the statute of limitations.

B.

The Course of the Proceedings.

1.

The Castorena Motion for Summary Judgment and Order.

On June 2, 2006, Civil Action CV-26-2474 styled Mildred Castorena, et al.
v. General Electric, et al., was filed in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Bannock

County, Idaho. (R. Vol. I, 87-123).~The lawsuit was brought by a number of
plaintiffs including, for purposes of this appeal, appellants Allene Stoor,
individually and as spouse and personal representative of the Estate of John D.
Stoor ("Stoor"), Stephanie Branch, individually and as personal representative of
the Estate of Robert Branch, Jr. ("Branch") and Marlene Kisling, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate of William D. Frasure ('~rasure").~ All
personal representatives were citizens and residents of the state of Idaho. (R. Vol.

I, 89). Plaintiffs, pursuant to the Idaho Wrongful Death Act, sued numerous
defendant corporations who either manufactured or sold asbestos-containing
products in Idaho asserting that exposure to asbestos caused injury and death to
Stoor, Branch and Frasure. (R. Vol. I, 87-123).
2

References to "R. Vol. -" are to the volume and page number of the record prepared by
the court clerk. References to "App. Ex. "
are to documents included in the Appendix
attached to this brief.
3
These personal representatives of the respective estates, along with John D. Adamson, are
referred to in this brief as "plaintiffs."

Defendants Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse filed motions for summary
judgment on November 9, 2007, seeking to dismiss the cases filed by the personal
representatives of decedents, John D. Stoor, Robert Branch, Jr. and William D.
Frasure. (R. Vol. V, 1110-1112) (R. Vol. V, 1128-1131) (R. Vol. V, 1137-1139).
The basic premise of the defendants' motions for summary judgment was the
same: Stoor, Branch and Frasure had objective proof of their injuries from
exposure to asbestos more than two years prior to the dates of their deaths so their
wrongful death causes of action, filed within two years of the date of death but
more than two years after diagnosis, were barred by the statute of limitations
because of the application of the condition precedent rule to Idaho's Wrongful
Death Statute. (R. Vol. V., 1147). Sterling Fluid Systems (USA), LLC, along with
the majority of the other defendants, filed a joinder to Westinghouse and IngersallRand's motion. (R. Vol. VI, 1494). After oral argument on December 10, 2007,
the trial court issued a January 28, 2008 memorandum decision and order that
denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding the wrongful
death claims. (R. Vol. VI, 1494). (App. Ex. "A").~
The court found that the
language of I.C. $ 5-311, the wrongful death statute, was "plain and unambiguous"
and did not contain "condition precedent" language found in other wrongful death

4

The plaintiffs filed a motion to augment the record with this January 28, 2008
Memorandum Decision and Ordev that was omitted from the clerk's record. The document is
attached in the Appendix for the convenience of this Court.

statutes allowing the heirs to maintain an action for wrongful death only if the
decedent could have maintained an action if death had not ensued. (R. Vol. VI,
1495).
On February 8, 2008, defendant Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC
("Sterling") filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying the
motions for summary judgment as to Stoor, Branch and Frasure. (Vol. VI, 14821484). In a memorandum decision and order dated March 18,2008, the trial court
reversed its original decision to deny the motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. (Vol. VII, 1652). The court
explained its rationale for now concluding that the literal omission of the condition
precedent rule from Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute was no longer controlling:
[Wlhile the Wrongful Death Statute does not expressly contain the
condition precedent language found in Lord Campbell's Act, the
Idaho Supreme Court interprets IC 5 5-3 11 as if it did contain such
language and has consistently and repeatedly required that the
Wrongful Death Statute be read "as if it expressly contains the
provision, "Whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the person
injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued."

(R. Vol. VII, 1651).
Following entry of this order, the trial court entered judgment against the
plaintiffslappellants. (R. Vol. VII, 1697-1700). A notice of appeal was filed by
the plaintiffs and a certificate of appeal was issued on May 7, 2008. (R. Vol. VII,
1701-1705). On June 19, 2008, because the original judgment had been misfiled,

the trial court entered a final judgment as to the plaintiffs. (R. Vol. VII, 17201723). The order conditionally dismissing the appeal was withdrawn. (R. Vol.
VII, 1728).
2.

The Adamson Motion for Summary Judgment and Order.

On July 18, 2006, John D. Adamson, individually and in his capacity as
personal representative of the Estate of John H. Adamson ("Adamson"), filed a
wrongful death complaint in Idaho State District Court in Bannock County. (R.
Vol. VIII, 1751- 1783). Adamson alleged that as a result of continuous exposure
to defendants' asbestos-containing materials and products his father, John H.
Adamson ("decedent), contracted mesothelioma and died from this disease on July
20,2004. (R. Vol. VIII, 1761).
On September 24, 2007, defendant Sterling Fluid Systems (USA) LLC
("Sterling") filed a motion for final summary judgment alleging that there was no
genuine issue of material fact that Adamson's wrongful death claims against the
defendant were barred because the decedent's personal injury cause of action had
expired in Idaho before his death. (R. Vol. IX, 2134-2141). Other defendants
joined in the motion. (R. Vol. X, 2290-2322).
Adamson filed a response to Sterling's motion for summary judgment
asserting that his cause of action was timely filed because, pursuant to Idaho's
adoption of Lord Campbell's Act from which the wrongfbl death statute codified

in I.C. 55-3 11 was derived, a new cause of action based on the same conduct was
created. (R. Vol. 10. 2322a - 2322j). On April 9, 2008, the trial court issued a
memorandum decision and order granting the defendants' motion for summary
judgment that became final and appealable on October 2, 2008. (R. Vol. XI, 2479
-

2489). On October 31, 2008, Adamson filed his notice of appeal. (R. Vol. XI,

2622

- 2629).

This Court granted the defendants' motion to consolidate appeals

and consolidated Docket No. 35852 with Docket No. 35123 (Docket No. 34124
had been previously consolidated with Docket No. 35123) for purposes of briefing
and oral argument. (Order 1212212008). (R. Vol. XI, 2635 - 2636).
C.

Statement of Facts.
Facts relevant to the issue on appeal are not in dispute. Plaintiff Alene Stoor

brought a wrongful death cause of action on behalf of her deceased husband John
Stoor alleging that he was continually exposed to the defendants' asbestos
containing products at the FMC plant in Pocatello, Idaho hom 1958 through 1992.
(R. Vol. I, 87-124). (R. Vol. V, 1148-1149). As a result of John Stoor's exposure
to asbestos, he developed asbestos-related pleural abnormalities consistent with
pneumonoconiosis and pleural thickening of the chest wall. (R. Vol. V, 1148).
This diagnosis was made on September 24, 2001 based upon a reading of an
August 24, 1991 chest x-ray. (R. Vol. V, 1148). Subsequently, three personal
injury actions were filed by John Stoor against various manufacturers of asbestos

containing products. (R. Vol. V, 1176-1179). Mr. Stoor died on June 13, 2004.
(R. Vol. V, 1119). Less than two years after his death, on June 2,2006, a wrongful
death cause of action was filed on behalf of his estate against the defendants in this
case. (R. Vol. V, 1119).
Robert Branch was exposed to the defendants' asbestos containing products
from 1955 through 1989 when he was employed at the FMC plant in Pocatello,
Idaho. (R. Vol. V, 1149). On July 1, 2003, a chest radiograph revealed that Mr.
Branch suffered from chronic interstitial disease (one form of which is asbestosis).
(R. Vol. V, 1149-1150). On September 7, 2006, Dr. Alvin Schonfeld read the
2003 chest radiographs of Robert Branch, Jr. and confirmed that there were pleural
abnormalities consistent with penumoconiosis (one cause of which is inhalation of
dust containing asbestos) and that pleural plaques (evidence of asbestos exposure)
were present on July 1, 2003. (R. Vol. V, 1150). Mr. Branch died on July 11,
2005. (R. Vol. V, 1129). A wrongful death claim was asserted on behalf of the
Estate of Robert Branch on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, 87-124).
William D. Frasure was exposed to asbestos containing products through his
employment at the FMC plant in Pocatello, Idaho from 1953 through 1988. (R.
Vol. V, 1138). A consultation report reflected that a chest x-ray taken on August
24, 2000 confirmed that Mr. Frasure had pleural plaques suggestive of asbestos

disease. (R. Vol. V, 1138). Mr. Frasure died on February 17,2006 and his widow
filed a wrongful death claim on June 2,2006. (R. Vol. I, 87-124).
On March 8,2002, John H. Adamson was diagnosed with mesothelioma. (R.
Vol. X, 2143). During his lifetime Mr. Adamson filed lawsuits in Mississippi and
Georgia involving his exposure to asbestos. (R. Vol. X, 2144). He died on July
20, 2004. (R. Vol. X, 2144). Less than two years after his death, a wrongful death
lawsuit was filed by John D. Adamson, his son, on behalf of his father's estate. (R.
Vol. X, 2144).

STANDARD OF RlEVIEW
"In reviewing the district court's decision on a motion for summary
judgment, the standard of review is whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact, and, if not, whether the prevailing party was entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." Sacred Heart Med. Ctv. V. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534,
535, 66 P.3d 238, 239 (Idaho 2003). If the evidence shows that there are no
disputed issues of fact, what remains is a question of law, over which the appellate
court exercises free review. Id.; see also, Thornock v. Boise Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 115 Idaho 466, 470, 767 P.2d 1241, 1245 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1068,

109 S.Ct. 2069, 104 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989)(conclusions of law are subject to a de
novo review by this Court). Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over
which this Court exercises free review. Harris v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare,
123 Idaho 295,297,847 P.2d 1156,1158 (1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Defendants' Motions for
I.
Summary Judgment on the Statute of Limitations in the Wrongful
Death Claims.
A.
The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Condition
Precedent Rule Must Be Read Into Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute.

1.

The trial courts' equivocal orders should be reversed.

The trial courts erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants
and in finding that the accrual date of the decedents' wrongful death causes
of action started on the date each decedent was diagnosed with the asbestosrelated disease aiid not on the date of death. The trial courts, while granting
summary judgment in the defendants' favor, recognized that there were
substantial grounds for difference of opinion concerning the application of
the condition precedent rule to Idaho's wrongful death statute. This is
evidenced by the equivocal nature of the courts' decisions.
In fact, the trial court in the Castovena case initially ruled that the
co~lditionprecedent rule did not apply to Idaho's wrongful death cause of
action. In the Memorandum Decision and Ovdev dated January 28,2008, in
the Castovena case, Judge Peter D. McDermott found that Idaho's wrongful
death cause of action was separate and distinct from an action for personal
injury and, as such, there was no condition precedent bar to the plaintiffs'
claims and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. Vol.

VII, 1641-1658 at 1648). (App. Ex. "A"). Turning to the plain language of
the statute, the trial court gave effect to the statute as written stating:
It is instructive that the [Wrongful Death Statute] makes no
mention and provides no provision for limitations on the
wrongful death actions. Furthermore, a clear reading of the
words and considering that the Idaho Legislature created
another statute to address personal injury claims, this Court
finds that the Wrongful Death Statute is an act separate from a
personal injury cause of action. . . . As such, there is no
condition precedent bar to the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs'
claims here.
(R. Vol. VII, 1649) (emphasis added). In denying the defendants' summary
judgment order, the trial court in Castovena was also persuaded by the fact
that Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute did not contain the specific proviso
allowing heirs to maintain an action for wrongful death only whenever the
wrongful act would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action if
death had not ensued. (See id.) (citations omitted).
The court reconsidered this decision at the request of the defendants
and issued another memorandum order and decision citing case law that
"implied" a condition precedent rule in Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute and
dismissed the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. (R. Vol. VII, 1641-1658 at

1651). The trial court noted that while "this Court remains convinced that
the plain language of the Wronghl Death Statute should be followed and is
opposed to judicial activism that assumes the true intent of the Legislature,

this Court is nonetheless required to follow established precedent." (R. Vol.
VII, 1641-1658 at 1652).
In the memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment
dated April 9, 2008, in the Adamson case, the trial court acknowledged that
this Court in Chapman suled that death began the tolling in a wrongful death
cause of action. (R. Vol. XI, 2479-2494 at 2485). However, the court
determined that because there was a "tendency" to construe the wrongful
death statute with the historical practice of requiring the decedent to have a
valid cause of action on the date of death and because the "majority7' of the
relevant cases "seem to apply" the condition precedent sule, the court would
do the same. (R. Vol. XI, 2485). Summary judgment was granted in favor
of the defendant and judgment entered accordingly dismissing the plaintiffs'
case. (R. Vol. XI, 2489, 2459). The tentative and qualified nature of both
decisions serves only to underscore the error inherent in the ultimate
decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.
The condition precedent ruIe does not square with the plain
2.
language of Idaho's Wrongful Death Statute nor with this Court's
clear holding in Chapman that a wrongful death cause of action
accrues on the date of death.
To reach the erroneous conclusion that Idaho's wrongful death statute
contained a condition precedent, the trial courts had to ignore principles of
statutory construction and a decision by this Court that held, without

restriction, that a cause of action for wrongful death accrued on the date of
death. See Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d
385 (1983).' Construction of Idaho's wrongful death act must begin by
putting the law in historical context. Both at common law prior to 1846 and
in this jurisdiction prior to 1888, the heirs of a person whose death was
caused by the wrongful act of another could not maintain a civil action for
damages. "At common law if the victim of a tort died before he recovered a
judgment, the victim's right of action also died." Evans v. Twin Falls
County, 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (Idaho 1990) citing Prosser &
Keeton on Torts,

5 125(a) (5th ed.1984). Nor could such right of action

could be continued by a representative of the decedent. Vulk v. Haley, 112
Idaho 855, 857, 736 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Idaho 1987). The common law
required that, with the death of either party to a civil action, "the action is
dead" and could be revived only by bringing a new action. Moon v. Bullock,
65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765, 767 (Idaho 1944) overruled on other grounds
by Doggett v. Boiler Engg & Supply Co., 92 Idaho 888 (1970).
In an attempt to ameliorate the harsh effects of common law rules, the
English Parliament enacted the Fatal Accidents Act in 1846, now more
commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act, which granted wrongful death
5

Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785,673 P.2d 385 (1983) will
be sometimes referred to as "Chapman."

4

damages to survivors. The common law became the law of the State of
Idaho, except so far as it was "not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the
constitution or laws of the United States" and in all cases not provided for in
Idaho law, "is the rule of decision in all courts of this state." I.C.

5

73-1 16

(1995). Consequently, absent a specific statutory enactment, wrongful death
claims could not be brought in Idaho.
The territorial legislature remedied this situation by modifying the
common law rule precluding any claim on behalf of the relatives or
dependents of a deceased person with the enactment of the first Idaho
Wrongful Death Statute at its 1881 session. Russell v. Cox, 148 P.2d 221,
223 (Idaho 1944). (citations omitted). Importantly, Idaho's wrongful death
statute, while modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, was inconsistent with the
English statute in one critical respect. Lord Campbell's Act states:
Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a
Person who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have
caused the Death of another Person, and it is oftentimes right
and expedient that the Wrongdoer in such Case should be
answerable in Damages for the Injury so caused by him: Be it
therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled,
and by the Authority of the same, That whensoever the Death
of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect, or
Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if
Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to
maintain an action and recover Damages in respect thereof,
then and in every such Case the Person who would have

been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an
Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the
person injured, and although the Death shall have been
caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to
Felony.
Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Iizc., 117 Idaho 1038, 1040,793 P.2d 7 11 , 7 13 at fn
1 (Idaho 1990) quoting Lord Campbell's Act: An Act for compensating the
Families of Persons killed by Accidents. 26th August 1846. The plain and
uiiambiguous language of the Idaho Wrongful Death Statute reads:
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives
on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing the death, or in case of the death of such
wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such
wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the
death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible
for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be
maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her
death, his or her personal representatives. In every action under
this section, such damages may be given as under all the
circumstances of the case as may be just.
I.C. 5 5-3 11. As observed by this Court, while the Idaho legislature modeled
the Idaho Wrongful Death Statute after Lord Campbell's Act, the Idaho
statute did not contain language mandating that the "act, neglect, or default
must have been such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an
actioii therefore if death had not ensued." Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622,
269 P. 993,994 (Idaho 1928)(citation omitted).

Using the statutory rules of construction employed by Idaho courts,
interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal
words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (Idaho
1999) (citations omitted); see also, "Death Statutes," 3A Sutherland
Statutory Construction $ 73:5 (6th ed.)("[w]here the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, this Court should give effect to the statute as
written, without engaging in statutory construction"); Albee v. Judy, 136
Idaho 226, 23 1, 3 1 P.3d 248, 253 (Idaho 2001)("[o]nly where the language
is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and
consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations"). (citations
omitted). However, a statute is not ambiguous merely because parties
present differing interpretations to the court. Payette River Property Owners
Ass'n v. Board of Corn'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d
477,483 (Idaho 1999).
An examination of the literal language of Idaho's wrongful death
statute as written by the state legislature reveals a straightforward premise:
the statute is triggered by the death of the person on whose behalf a claim is
initiated:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives

on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing the death.
I.C.

4 5-311 (emphasis added). Idaho's wrongful death statute does not

impose a condition precedent on the right of the heirs of a person whose
death was caused by the negligent acts of another to file suit with the
statutorily prescribed limitations period. The plain terms of the wrongful
death statute - not contrary implications - control its meaning. Had the
legislature intended for the statute to include a condition precedent, it could
have expressed such intent in plain English. As written, Idaho's wrongful
death statute contains no condition precedent language and is to be given its
plain, obvious and rational meaning. See State, Dept. of Health & WeEfave
ex vel. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho 776,779,890 P.2d 727,730 (Idaho 1995).
This Court unequivocally holds, relying upon the plain
3.
language of the wrongful death statute, that a cause of action for
wrongful death accrues on the death of the injured party, and not
before.
Although the original Lord Campbell's Act contained an express
provision limiting death actions to those cases where the deceased might
have recovered damages had he lived, Idaho's wrongful death statute makes
no mention of a condition precedent to wrongful death actions. Therefore,
the wrongful death statute must be given its plain meaning and interpreted in

conjunction with Idaho law which has historically held that "the right to
bring the wrongful death action accrued as of the date of death." Hogan v.
Hevmann, 101 Idaho 893, 895, 623 P.2d 900, 902 (Idaho 1980) citing
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944); Whitley v. Spokane Ry.
Co., 23 Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913) a f d 237 U.S. 487, 35 S.Ct. 655, 59
L.Ed. 1060; S. Speiser, Recovery fov Wrongfiul Death, $ 11:10 (2d ed. 1975);
22 Am.Jur.2d "Death" $ 40 (1965); 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1154 s 3 (1964). An
examination of the plain language of the wrongful death statute compels the
conclusion that, under the statute as written, there is no mandate that the
deceased have a viable claim at the time of death but, instead, simply
identifies the death as the event that triggers the statute. And while there are
Idaho cases that favor implying a condition precedent rule, this Court
unequivocally pronounced in Chapman that, based on statutory construction,
a cause of action for wrongful death accrues upon the death of the injured
party and not before:
I.C. $ 5-219 begins the statutory period of limitation at the time
the cause of action accrues, and as noted above, defines accrual
as the "time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of."
However, the law is clear that a cause of action for wrongful
death accrues on the death of the injured party, and not
before. Hogan v. Hevmann, 101 Idaho 893, 623 P.2d 900
(1980); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944).

673 P.2d at 386-387 (emphasis added). The logic of equating the accrual
date with the date of death is uncomplicated because the wrongful death
cause of action "did not accrue to the decedent." Id.

This Court in

Chapman relied heavily upon other Idaho case law for this conclusion and

quoted from W7zitley v. Spokane Ry. Co., 23 Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913),
affd, 237 U.S. 487,35 S.Ct. 655,59 L.Ed. 1060 (1915):
'[Tlhe action is allowed upon the theory that the wrongful
death of the ancestor works a personal injury to his heirs, in
that it deprives them of some pecuniary or other benefit
which they would have received except for the death of the
ancestor. The statute confers this right of action on the heirs
23 Idaho at 659,132 P. 121. (Emphasis added.)

....'

673 P.2d at 387. This Court then properly concluded:
The cause of action which accrues to an injured person
during his lifetime is altogether separate from the cause of
action accruing to the person's heirs should he die from that
injury. Russell v. Cox, supra. Therefore, the "occurrence"
giving rise to the cause of action is the decedent's wrongful
death, and the statute of limitations must date from that
event.

Id. (emphasis added). Like the defendants in the motions for summary

judgment in this consolidated appeal, the defendant in Chapman argued that
an action by the heirs of a deceased could only be brought if the deceased
could have brought an action himself. In rejecting that argument, this Court
stated:

The logic of the latter approach is that since the limitation
period had run on the cause of action dating from the
implanting of the pacemaker, or its failure, the decedent could
not have brought suit at the time this action was filed, and thus
the heirs could not have brought suit. However, the rule that
heirs can bring an action only if the deceased could have is
merely a means of indicating that Lord Campbell's Act did not
enlarge the scope of tort liability but simply created a new
cause of action based on the same conduct. In other words, the
death must have been "wrongful" to the same degree conduct
causing injury must be wrongful to be actionable. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440, 24 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed.
5 13 (1904).
We hold that the "occurrence, act or omission" which I.C. 9 5219 defines as the accrual of a cause of action refers to the
death of the person, caused by the wrongful acts of another, and
the running of the statute of limitation on the wrongful death
cause of action begins from the date of death.
Chapman, 673 P.2d at 387.

This, then, is not an issue decided by

"implication" but by reading the literal language of the statute. This Court
recognized in Chapman that the accrual date of an action for wrongful death
is the date of death of the injured party regardless of whether or not the
decedent had a viable cause of action at the time of death. This is still the
law in Idaho applicable to all wrongful death claims.
Idaho's wrongful death action is a separate statutory cause
of action.

4.

Idaho law is clear.

A wrongful death action is not merely a

continuation of a decedent's personal injury claim. Nor is it a derivative
cause of action. It is, rather, an entirely new cause of action created by

statute based on the death of the decedent in order to provide a mechanism
for the heirs of the decedent to be compensated for their loss. In considering
Idaho's wrongful death statute, then codified as Section 4100 of the Idaho
Code, this Court said:
This brings us to a consideration of the nature of this cause of
action and the status of respondent in the courts of Idaho.
Section 4100 of the Rev. Codes authorizes the prosecution of an
action by the "heirs or personal representatives" of a deceased
person against a person wrongfully causing the death of such
person, and any judgment obtained in such an action inures to
the benefit of the heirs of the decedent and in no case becomes
a part of the assets of the estate of the deceased. Except for this
statute, no such action could be prosecuted in this state and
no such cause of action could accrue in this state.
Whitley v. Spokane & I. Ry. Co., 132 P. 121, 126 (Idaho 1913) a f d , 237
U.S. 487, 35 S. Ct. 655, 59 L.Ed. 1060 (1915) (emphasis added). This Court
continued:
The cause of action is not anything that ever belonged to the
decedent or to his estate. It never accrued to the decedent. The
action is allowed upon the theory that the wrongful death of the
ancestor works a personal injury to his heirs, in that it deprives
them of some pecuniary or other benefit which they would have
received except for the death of the ancestor. The statute
confers this right of action on the heirs, and it gives it directly
to them or a personal representative such as an executor or
administrator; and, when such representative prosecutes the
action, he does so as trustee for the heirs.
See id. With no limiting or conditional language in the statute, Idaho's
wrongful death statute created an independent cause of action on its face and

did not predicate the right to bring the action on the existence of a separate
cause of action held by the injured person prior to death. A wrongful death
claim does not even arise until the death of the injured person. Only then do
the decedent's heirs suffer a legal injury and have a right to bring a claim,
pursuant to I.C.

4 219(4), within two years of the date of death.

This is in

accord with the Restatement (Second) of Torts:

A cause of action for death is complete when death occurs.
Under most wrongful death statutes, the cause of action is a
new and independent one, accruing to the representative or to
surviving relatives of the decedent only upon his death; and
since the cause of action does not come into existence until the
death, it is not barred by prior lapse of time, even though the
decedent's own cause of action for the injuries resulting in death
would be barred. In some jurisdictions, however, the wrongful
death acts take the form of statutes providing for the survival of
the decedent's own cause of action, in which case the statute of
limitations necessarily runs from the time of his original injury.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 4 899 Statutes ofLimitations (1979).
When actions for wrongful death were authorized in Idaho, this Court
held that the common law rule preventing recovery from the personal
representative of the deceased tortfeasor remained in force. Hayward v.
Valley Vista Cave Covp., 136 Idaho 342, 351, 33 P.3d 816, 825 at h 2 (Idaho
2001, J. Eismann concurring). In order to remedy this, the legislature
enacted a survival statute that permitted tort actions, except actions for
slander or libel, to survive the death of the wrongdoer. Id. citing Evans v.

Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990); I.C. $ 5-327 (1998).
This statute was separate and apart from the wrongful death statute and
distinguished by various factors. For example, under Idaho's wrongful death
statute, only the decedent's heirs may recover and only for the damages
suffered by the heirs of the decedent because of his or her death, such as loss
of guidance, support, etc. Id. Under Idaho's survival statute, the decedent's
estate becomes the beneficiary and can sue for damages that the decedent
could have sued for had he survived, while a wrongful death action involves
the damages suffered by the heirs of the decedent because of his death, such
as loss of guidance, support, etc. Id. The wronghl death causes of action
instituted by the heirs of the decedents accrued on the date of their deaths
and are timely filed even though the decedents' own causes of action for the
injuries resulting in death would be barred.

B. The Trial Court Erred in Presuming That This Court
Would Apply the Condition Precedent Rule to a Wrongful Death
Claim.
All defendants as well as the trial courts relied heavily on Adams v.
Avmstrong World Industries in support of the supposition that this Court
would apply the condition precedent rule in the statute of limitations context.

(R. Vol. - 1648; 2483). See Adams v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 596 F.
Supp. 1407, 1412-14 (D. Idaho 1984), appealed sub nom, Waters v.

Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 248 (9" Cir. 1985), a f d in part,
vev'd in part, 790 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1986) after remand, 664 F.Supp. 463
(D.Idaho 1987),judgment on limitations vacated on other gvounds 847 F.2d
589 (9th Cir.1988). The Adams court stated that "[tlhe Idaho Supreme Court
has never specifically addressed whether the heir may maintain a wrongful
death action if the deceased, at the date of death, would have been barred by
the statute of limitations" and then determined that "if faced with the
question, the Idaho court would apply the condition precedent rule to the
statute of limitations." 596 F. Supp. at 1414.
On appeal in Waters v. Avrnstrong the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reiterated that "the Idaho Supreme Court has never determined whether an
applicable statute of limitations can be a "condition precedent" whose failure
would bar a cause of action for wrongful death under Idaho Code § 5-3 11
and certified that question to this Court. 773 F.2d at 250. Certification of
that question was rejected because, as informed by this Court, prior
decisions were "sufficient to give guidance for the determination of the
Idaho law involved in this action." 664 F. Supp. at 464.
Chapman, decided in the year before Adams remained the controlling
authority amd offered guidance to other courts because this decision, too,
was based on a question certified from a federal district court, i.e.,

"whether, in a wrongful death action, the statute of limitations begins to
run from the date of death or from the date of the injury from which
death resulted." 673 P.2d at 386 (emphasis added). This Court's answer
was straightforward. Idaho recognized a right of action in the heirs of a
person whose death was caused by the negligence of another. Id. The
statute of limitations for a wrongful death cause of action was two years
from the accrual date. See id. And a wrongful death cause of action accrued
"on the death of the injured party, and not before." Id.
Undoubtedly the Chapman court was aware of, and indeed discussed
and rejected, the reasoning of this Court in the 1934 case of Helgeson v.
Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 34 P.2d 957, 961 (1934). 673 P.2d at 387. The
defendants in Helgeson, much like the defendants in these cases, asserted
that the accrual date of the wrongful death cause of action was limited by the
date of the injury causing death. Id. at 387. This Court in Chapman
dismissed the argument by saying that "the rule that heirs can bring an action
only if the deceased could have is merely a means of indicating that Lord
Campbell's Act did not enlarge the scope of tort liability, but simply created
a new cause of action based on the same conduct." Id. The date of the
injury was, therefore, considered but did not deter this Court from making
the final pronouncement:

We hold that the "occurrence, act or omission" which I.C. 5 5219 defines as the accrual of a cause of action refers to the
death of the person, caused by the wrongful acts of another, and
the running of the statute of limitation on the wrongful death
cause of action begins from the date of death.
Chapman, 673 P.2d at 387.
Evidently the trial courts' reliance on Helgeson and other cases that
implied a condition precedent in Idaho's wrongful death statue was
misinformed. This Court specifically addressed Helgeson in Chapman and
chose not to limit the accrual date of the statute to the date of the injury
causing death as was done in Helgeson. (R. Vol. VII, 1651). Inexplicably,
the trial courts in their decisions in Castorena and Adamson relied upon
Helgeson as authority for granting the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The Castorena court, citing Helgeson, reconsidered its original
decision to deny the defendants' summary judgment and granted summary
judgment saying the court was now aware of earlier case law and precedent
by the Idaho Supreme Court that the wrongful death statute must be read as

if it

expressly contained the condition precedent language. (R. Vol. VII,

1651). Likewise, the court in Adamson was persuaded by Helgeson and
granted summary judgment based on that decision because "[allthough the
Court in Chapman determined that death began the tolling" more recent
cases "seem to apply the condition precedent rule." (R. Vol. XI, 284-285).

In effect, the trial courts ignored the analysis in Chapman and chose
to presume that this Court would ignore its ultimate finding in that case. The
"presumption" that this Court would apply the condition precedent rule to
the statute of limitations is unfounded. Furthermore, it has long been the rule
that changes in the common law by the adoption of a statute are not to be
presumed, but must be clearly intended before they will be given effect.
Rook v. Trout, 113 Idaho 652,657, 747 P.2d 61, 66 (Idaho 1987) overruled
on other grounds by Shenvood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452
(Idaho 1991)( citations omitted). There is no evidence, and in fact there is
evidence to the contrary, that based on the plain language of Idaho's
wrongful death statute the Idaho legislature intended to incorporate a
condition precedent incorporated into Idaho's wrongful death statute. The
trial courts' decisions to apply the condition precedent rule to the plaintiffs'
cases was error, pure and simple.
11.

The Trial Courts' Rulings Deprive
Constitutional Rights.

Idaho

Citizens of

If the trial courts' decision to impose a condition precedent on
Idaho's wrongful death is allowed to stand, the plaintiffs and all similarly
situated plaintiffs will be deprived of access to Idaho courts and prevented
from bringing their claims within the time expressly allowed by the
wrongful death statute.

Access to the courts of this state is a right

guaranteed to Idaho citizens pursuant to the "open courts" provision of
Article I, $ 18 of the Idaho Constitution which provides:
Justice to be freely and speedily administered.- Courts of
justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy
afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and
right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice.
Idaho Constitution art. 1, 5 18. See also, Day v. Day, 12 Idaho 556, 86 P.

53 1 (Idaho 1906)("[u]nder the provisions of section 18, art. 1, Const. Idaho,
as well as by the unwritten dictates of natural justice, the courts of this state
are commanded to administer justice without prejudice").
The trial courts' decision to impose a condition precedent on Idaho's
Wrongful Death Act is in derogation of the open access principals of the
Idaho Constitution because the effect is to time-bar a cause of action before
it even accrues -and act of extreme prejudice. This, in turn, creates an
unjust and even ludicrous state of affairs in which the decedents would have
had to bring their wrongful death claims within two years of the date of the
diagnosis of their injury, notwithstanding the fact that the decedents was still
living two years after diagnosis and died more than two years after
diagnosis. No wrongful death action could be filed while the decedents were
still alive and, if one were filed, it would be dismissed. Nevertheless, this is
the illogical result of a ruling that establishes the accrual of a wrongful death

cause action on the date of injury and not the date of death. The trial courts'
decision effectively extinguished the plaintiffs' right to sue. This outcome
violates fundamental principles of fairness and denies the beneficiaries of a
person who dies because of the negligence of another more than two years
after the infliction of an injury any remedy or access to the courts of Idaho.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in this brief, Plaintiffs/Appellants request that this Court reverse
the rulings of the trial courts disiilissing their claims and deny the defendants' summary
judgnlent n~otioilsbased on the statute of lilnitations
DATED this

(3&-

day of August, 2009
Respectfully submitted,

Petersen, Parkinson & Arnold, PLLC
Attorney for PlaintiffsiAppellants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
MILDRED CASTORENA, et al.
Plaintiffs,
VS.

GENERAL ELECTRIC, et al.,
Defendants.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV-2006-2474-PI
ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREWITH ORDEMD this Court's Decision dated
January 28,2008 in Norton v. General Electric, et al, Bannock County Case CV2006-

2475-PI sl1all also apply in this case Castorena, et a1 v. General Electric, et a1 CV2006?!

kt

2474-PI. And a copy of said Decision is attached hereto and filed in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 3othday of January, 2008.

District Judge
Copies to:
G. Patterson Keahey
Gary L. Cooper
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IN THE DZSTR~CT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

MILDRED CASTORENA, et al.
Plaintiffs,
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Defendants.
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NATURE
OF THE ACTION
This case is a products liability action wherein the Plaintiffs generally allege the

\

Defendants are responsible for the manufacture of asbestos-containingproducts or machinery to
which the Plaintiffs allege they were exposed. The Plaintiffs assert this exposure caused serious
injury andlor death fox which they are entitled to recover damages in this lawsuit.
CBS Corporation, a Delawire corporation, W a Viacom, Inc., successor by merger to
CBS Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation, W a Westinghouse Electric Corporation
("Westinghouse") and Ingersoll-Rand Corporation ("Ingersoll-Rand") (collectively referred to
herein as "Moving Defendants") filed a Motion for S m a r y Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert

L.Hronek and Norman L. Day (collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Personal Injury
Plaintiffs"). The Moving Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against
Plaintiffs Alene Stoor, individually and as a spouse and personal representative of the Estate of

John Stoor ("Stoor"), steph&ie Branch, individually and as personal representative of the Estate
Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Ingersoli-Rand and Westinghouse's Motionsfor Summary Judgment
Case No. CV-2006-2474-PI

$.da
:

of Robert Branch, Jr. ("Branch") and Marlene Kisling, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of William D. Frasure ("Frasure") (collectively referred to herein as
"Plaintiffs" or "Wrongful Death Plaintiffs").
This Court heard oral arguments regarding these summary judgment motions on
December 10,2007, taking the case under advisement. After receiving oral arguments and
reviewing the entire file, including the briefs filed by counsel, this Court enters the foliowing
Memorandum Decision and Order.

1.

Whether to grant the Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Personal
Injury Plaintiffs Hronek and Day.

2.

Whether to grant the Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Wrongful
Death Plaintiffs Stoor, Branch and Frasure.

Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the
party moving for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89,867 P.2d 960,963

(1994). This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous.

Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485,887 P.2d 29,30 (1994). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of

Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse'sMotions for Summary Judgment
Case No. CV-2006-2474-PI

material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho
434,437,807 P.2d 1272,1275 (1991).
If the moving party challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden now shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Tingley, 125 Idaho at 90,
867 P.2d at 964. Sumary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case upon
which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530-3 1,887 P.2d at
1037-38; Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126,127 (1988). The party opposing the
summaryjudgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set

forth specificfacts showing that there is a genuine issuefor trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e) (emphasis
added).
DISCUSSION

1.

Whether to grant the Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Personal Injury Plaintiffs Hronek and Day.
The complaint in this action was filed on June 2,2006, and alleges nine counts, four of

which are applicable to the Moving Defendants, including counts of negligence, strict liability,
misrepresentation and battery, civil conspiracy and fraudulent concealment. Pursuant to their
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Moving Defendants are requesting summay judgment on all
of the above-named claims asserted against them.
Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Motions for Summary Judgment
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a.

Whether Plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims are barred by the
statute of limitations.

First, the Moving Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability
claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Pursuant to Idaho Code ("IC") Section 5-219(4),
personal injury actions must be brought within two years of the date the cause of action accrues.
That section states in pertinent part:

5-219. Actions against officers, for penalties, on bonds, and for professional
malpractice or for personal injuries. - Within two (2) years:
An action to recover damages
for an injury to the person, or for the
(4)
death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, including any such
action arising from breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant; .,, the
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence,
act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by
reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and
the alleged wrongdoer, and, provided further, that an action .,, must be
commenced within ... two (2) years following the occurrence, act or omission
complained of, whichever is later.

...

In addressing asbestos personal injury cases specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has
determined that a cause of action accrues "on the date the injury became 'objectively
ascertainable.' This means that the cause of action accrues when 'objective medical proof would
support the existence of an actual injury."' Brennan v. Owen-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 134
Idaho 800, 801, 10 P.3d 749,750 (2000)(citing Davis v. Moran, 112 Idaho 703,706,735 P.2d
1014, 1020 (1987)). This rule applies even though the plaintiff may not be aware of the actual
injury or its cause. Id, at 802, 10 P.3d at 751. The Brennan court further found that the cause of
action accrues and the statute of limitation commences when objective medical proof would
support the existence of an actual injury resulting from asbestos exposure. Id. Thus, if a plaintiff
Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Motions for Summary Judgment
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fails to file suit within two years from the date of first objective medical proof of disease or
injury, his or her claims are barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in IC $ 5-219(4).
Facts that may constitute "objective medical proof that would support the existence of an actual
injury resulting from exposure to asbestos," thereby commencing the running of the statute of
limitations, include: (1) an examination in order to detect asbestos-related diseases; (2) a chest
x-ray which showed scarring of the lung of a kind that can be seen after asbestos exposure; (3)
changes in the lung consistent with the type of injury and disease that can be seen after asbestos
exposure; or (4) presence of pleural plaques or scarring in the lining of the lung which indicates
asbestos exposure. Id. at 801.
In this case, objective medical proof establishes that both Plaintiff Hronek and Plaintiff
Day suffered from asbestos-related injuries more than two years before the complaint was filed
in this case on June 2,2006. For example, "Hronek testified in his deposition that he was first
told that he had an asbestos-related disease by his doctor, Dr. Christon, in 2000 while he was still
working at FMC." (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Statement of Undisputed Facts in
Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. against Hronek ("Hronek Statement of Undisputed Facts"), Nov. 9,
2007,¶2.) Further, a radiograph taken of his chest on April 29,2003, revealed the presence of
pleural plaques. Dr. Schonfeld, the doctor retained by Hronek, read that radiograph on
November 17,2005. Dr. Schonfeld "concluded in an ILO 'B-reading' report of that date that the
04/29/03 radiograph revealed pleural abnormalities consistent with pneumoconiosis (one form of
which is asbestosis) and the existence of pleural plaques (evidence of exposure to asbestos)."
(Id. at 7 3.) Additionally, in a Claim Form filed against Pfizer, Inc., wherein Plaintiff I-Ironek
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sought to recover compensation for his asbestos-related injury, Hronek admitted he "was
diagnosed with asbestosis on 07111/03, as a result of asbestos exposure from 1956 through 2001
at the FMC plant in Pocatello, Idaho." (Id. at 15.) Hronek testified in his deposition that the
information regarding his diagnosis of asbestosis included on the Claim Form was "accurate."
(Id.) Thus, it makes no difference that onNovember 17,2005, the doctor retained by Hronek's
attorney coifmed the diagnosis of asbestos-related disease previously made by other medical
doctors. Plaintiff Hronek's admission that he had personal knowledge of his diagnosis of
asbestos disease as early as 2000, and no later than July 11,2003, is sufficient to commence the
d

g of the limitation period under IC 5 5-219(4). Because Hronek did not file his claim until

June 2,2006, his negligence and strict liability claims against Moving Defendants are barred by
the statute of limitations.
The undisputed facts regarding Plaintiff Day similarly show that he suffered from
asbestos-related injuries more than two years before the complaint was filed in this case. Like
Hronek, Plaintiff Day admitted, through various documents, that he wasdiagnosed with
asbestosis on February 17,2004. (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Statement of
Undisputed Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. against Day ("Day Statement of Undisputed
Facts"), Nov. 9,2007, qjqj 5-6.) On March 20,2004, a chest x-ray was taken of Day, "and a Chest
X-Ray Report of that date was generated stating: 'The patient states she (sic) has a history of
pulmonary fibrosis secondary to asbestosis."' (Id. at 78.) Also, on February 17,2004, James
W. Ballard, M.D., read a June 27,2003, chest x-ray. Dr. Ballard "concluded in an ILO 'Breading' report of that date that the 06/27/03 chest x-ray revealed parenchymal and pleural
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abnormalities consistent with pneumoconiosis (one form of which is asbestosis)." (Id,at 7 4.)
Plaintiff Day's counsel also asked Alice Boylan, MM., to review that same ILO "B-reading"
report. "Dr. Boylan concluded: 'it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
that the changes revealed in the ILO report of 2/17/04 are causally related to the disease
asbestosis because of Mr. Day's occupational exposure to asbestos." (Id, at qj 6.) Further, in a
Claim Form also filed against Pfizer, Inc., seeking to recover from Pfizer compensation for
Day's asbestos-related injury, Day admitted he was diagnosed with asbestosis on February 17,
2004, the same date as Dr. Ballard's 02/17/04 "B-reading" report. (Id. at 7 5.) In addition, Day
signed an affidavit wherein he "admitted that he was presently suffering from asbestosis and/or
the physical disorder arising from or related to exposure to asbestos which was confirmed by a
written diagnosis of a medical doctor on 02/17/04." (Id. at 1 7.) Thus, l i e Plaintiff Hronek,
because Plaintiff Day did not file his claim until June 2,2006, more than two years after the
relevant February 17,2004, date, his negligence and strict liability claims against Moving
Defendants are bmed by the statute of limitations.
In their response memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that "it was not until Dr. Schonfeld, a

quali$ed B-Reader, actually read and interpreted the x-rays that plaintiffs' asbestos-related
injuries became 'objectively ascertainable."' (Pls.' Resp. to Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and
Westinghouse's Mot. for Surnm. J. against Personal Injury Pls. Hronek and Day, Nov. 27,2007,
3.) While the Plaintiffs argue that the first objective medical proof of their asbestos-related

injuries did not occur until November of 2005 when Dr. Alvin Schonfeld, a doctor retained by
their attorney, reviewed old x-rays and old x-ray reports of other physicians, and confirmed the
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diagnoses of asbestos disease previously made by those other physicians, the undisputed proof,
as set forth above, shows otherwise.
The Plaintiffs further argue that the limitation period contained in IC 5 5-219(4) did not
accrue until they became aware they were suffering from asbestos-related injuries. (Id. at 4.) In
support of that argument, the Plaintiffs cite to the case of Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836,475
P.2d 530 (1969). However, the Plaintiffs' reliance on that case is misplaced, as Renner was
overruled by the 1971 amendment of IC 5 5-219(4) wherein the Idaho Legislature created two
discovery exceptions only -- one for leaving a foreign object in a body and the other for
fraudulent concealment of a wrongful or negligent act of professional malpractice. The pertinent
portion of that statute states:
[Wlhen the action is for damages arising out of the placement and inadvertent, accidental
or unintentional leaving of any foreign object in the body of any person 6y reason of the
professional malpractice of any hospital, physician or other person or institution
practicing any of the healing arts or when the fact of damage has, for the purpose of
escaping responsibility therefor, been fraudulently and knowingly concealed from the
injured party by an alleged wrongdoer standing at the time of the wrongful act, neglect or
breach in a professional or commercial relationship with the injured party, the same shall
be deemed to accrue when the injured party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have been put on inquiry regarding the condition or matter complained of. . .

.

For cases falling outside of these two express exceptions, the 1971 amended version of IC 3 5219(4) provides that:
[I]n all other actions, whether arising from professional malpractice or otherwise, the
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or
omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by reason of any
continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional
or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer, and,
provided further, that an action within the foregoing foreign object or fraudulent
concealinent exceptions must be commenced within one (1) year following the date of
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accrual as aforesaid or two (2) years following the occurrence, act or omission
complained of, whichever is later.
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically disagreed with the argument that damages
must be objectively ascertainable to, or known by, the plaintiff in order to commence the sunning
of the statute of limitations. That court held that such a rule "would amount to a discovery rule
which our cases have expressly rejected in light of the legislature's explicit rejection of the
discovery rule, LC. § 5-219(4)." Davis, 112 Idaho at 709,735 P.2d at 1020. As such, whether or
not a plaintiff knows or has been informed of his or her injury is not pertinent to a statute of
limitation analysis under IC 5-219(4). Therefore, based on the undisputed facts as set forth
above, it is irrelevant that on November 17,2005, Dr. Schonfeld, a doctor retained by Plaintiffs'
counsel, confirmed the diagnosis of asbestos-related disease previously made by other medical
doctors since the Personal Injury Plaintiffs filed their complaint more than two years after their
first diagnosis of asbestos-related disease. Therefore, the negligence and strict products liability
claims of Plaiiltiffs Hronek and Day are basred by IC 5 5-219(4).
The Plaintiffs also appear to argue that IC 5 5-219(4) violates Art. 1 , s 18 of the Idaho
Constitution. (Pls.' Resp. to Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Mot. for S u m . 3. against
Personal Injury Pls. Hronek and Day at 4.) However, that argument is based on the assumption
that Plaintiffs' causes of action were barred by IC 5 5-219(4) before they had actual knowledge
or reasonably should have discovered their injuries. As the Plaintiffs argued: "The Moving
Defendants [sic] assertions that this court should refuse to hold that a cause of action accrues
under LC. 5 5-219(4) only after the injured party discovers (or reasonably should have
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discovered) the facts giving rise to his or her cause of action, is seemingly oblivious to art. 1 , s

18 of the Idaho Constitution

. . . !'

(Pls.' Resp, to Defs.' Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's

Mot. for S m . J. against Personal Injury Pls. Hronek and Day at 4.) Such assumption is
unfounded since the undisputed facts demonstrate that both Plaintiffs Hronek and Day had actual
knowledge of their asbestos-related injuries more than two years before they filed their
complaint. As such, neither claim was barred by the limitation period before they became aware
of their injuries, as this Court has already determined that Hronek and Day should have filed
their complaint within the applicable limitation period. As such, this Court disregards the
Plaintiffs' attempt to now attack the constitutionality of IC $5-219(4) since both Personal Injury
Plaintiffs simply failed to file their claim in a timely manner.

b.

Whether this Court should dismiss the remaining causes of action.

In their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Moving
Defendants argue that Counts Three and Four of the complaint, including the Plaintiffs' claims
for misrepresentation, battery, frauduleilt concealment and civil conspiracy, should also be
dismissed. 111their Response to Defendants Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Motion for
Summary Judgment Against Personal Injury Plaintiffs Hronek and Day, the Plaintiffs only
addressed one of the Moving Defendants' arguments for dismissal - failure to plead
misrepresentation with particularity. Specifically, the Plaintiffs stated: "This claim and the other
allegations in Count Three of Plaintiffs Complaint clearly satisfy Idaho's law requiring
misrepresentation to be pled with particularity." (Pls.' Resp. to Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and
Westinghouse's Mot. for S w n . J. against Personal Injury Pls. Hronek and Day at 6.)
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1.

Whether the Plaintiffs pled their claims of fraudulent
misrepresentation with any particularity.

Pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP), claims of fraud and
misrepresentation must be pled with particularity. That rule states:
Rule 9(b). Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind, violation of civil or constitutional
rights.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or constitutional rights,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or constitutional
rights shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.
To prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish the following elements:

(1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable
reliance; and (9) resultant injury.
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166,1170 (2007) (citation omitted). Furthermore:
Rule 9(b) requires that "allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of
the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend
against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Silver Valley

Partners, LLC v. De Motte, No. 06-429-N-ELJ, 2007 WL 2802315, at *4 @. Idaho Sept. 24,
2007)(citation omitted). That court further stated:
"[Tlhere is no absolute requirement that where several defendants are sued in connection
with an alleged fraudulent scheme, the complaint must identify false statements made by
each and every defendant. Participation by each conspirator in every detail in the
execution of the conspiracy is unnecessary to establish liability, for each conspirator may
be perfonning different tasks to bring about the desired result." Swartz v. KPMG LLP,
476 F.3d 756, 765 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted) "On the other hand, Rule 9fi) does
not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but requires plaintiffs
to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant ... and inform each
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defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud.
In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a
minimum, identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme." Id, at
765-766 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id.

In this case, the Plaintiffs' Complaint makes the same conclusory misrepresentation
allegations against each of the 65 Defendants, without making any specific allegations that any
representations, false or otherwise, were made by the Moving Defendants to Plaintiff Hionek or
Plaintiff Day or that the Plaintiffs relied on representations made by those Defendants. For
example, the Complaint includes allegations that the Moving Defendants "&irmatively

.

.

misrepresent[ed] .. in advertising, labels and otherwise, that the asbestos containing products ..
were safe in their ordinary and foreseeable use." (Compl., June 2,2006,7 74(e)). The
Complaint further alleges that "by placing [asbestos-containingproducts andlor machinery] on
the market, [Moving Defendants] represented that they would safely do the job for which they
were intended . . . ." (Id. at q/ 82.) These allegations amount to general averments and do not

satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) as the allegations of fraud here are not specific enough and
do not "identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme." Thus, the
Plaintiffs general averments directed at fraud are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of IRCP
9(b). See Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127,106 P.3d 449,453
(2005). As such, any fraud claims alleged by the Plaintiffs in Counts Three and Four should be
dismissed for failure to plead with specificity.
Additionally, it is important to note that even if the Plaintiffs had satisfied the
requirements of IRCP 9(b), they have failed to satisfy their burden pursuant to IRCP 56, as the
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Plaintiffs have simply cited allegations included in their complaint and have failed to file any
affidavits pertaining to their fraud claims.
2.

Whether the Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of IRCP 56.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs' failure to present any evidence or argument in opposition to the
Defendants' other arguments is also viewed by this Court not only as a concession of those
points, but as a further violation of Rule 56. As explained previously, Idaho law provides that a
party against whom summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on the allegations
contained in the complaint, but must come forward with evidence to contradict the assertions of
the moving party in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the Plaintiffs have
failed to produce any affidavits regarding their claims of misrepresentation, battery, fraudulent
concealment and/or civil conspiracy setting forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial", these claims must be dismissed pursuant to IRCP 56.
2.

Whether to grant the Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Wrongful Death Plaintiffs Stoor, Branch and Frasure.
The Moving Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Wrongful

Death Plaintiffs Stoor, Branch and Frasure, which motion is similar to their request for summary
judgment against Plaintiffs Hronek and Day as set forth previously.
a.

Whether the Plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability claims are barred by
the statute of limitations,

The Moving Defendants argue that, like Plaintiffs Hronek and Day, the decedents' claims
for negligence and strict liability are also barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained
in IC $ 5-219(4) since objective medical proof established that the decedents suffered from
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asbestos-related injuries more than two years before the complaint was filed in this case on June
2,2006. As a result, the Moving Defendants contend the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs are now also
barred from pursuing their claims. The Moving Defendants argue:
[A] condition precedent to pursuing a claim for wrongful death is that the decedent must
have been able to maintain a cause of action had he lived. In other words, Wrongful
Death Plaintiffs may not 'revive' decedents' negligence and strict products liability
claims if the decedents' claims would have been barred by the statute of limitations, had
their deaths not ensued.
(Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Mem. in Supp. of Mot for Summ. J. against Wrongful
Death Pls., Nov. 9,2007,ll.)
1.

Whether the decedents' claims were time-barred before their deaths.

As set forth above, pursuant to IC 5 5-219(4), personal injury actions must be brought
within two years of the date the cause of action accrues. That section states in pertinent part.
5-229. Actions against officers, for penalties, on bonds, and for professional
malpractice or for personal injuries. -Within two (2) years:
An action to recover damages ... for an injury to the person, or for the
(4)
death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, including any such
action arising from breach of an implied warranty or implied covenant; ... the
cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occwrence,
act or omission complained of, and the limitation period shall not be extended by
reason of any continhg consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and
the alleged wrongdoer, and, provided further, that an action ... must be
commenced within ... two (2) years following the occurrence, act or omission
complained of, whichever is later.

In addressing asbestos personal injury cases specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has
determined that a cause of action accrues "on the date the injury became 'objectively
ascertainable.' This means that the cause of action accrues when 'objective medical proof would
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support the existence of an actual injury."' Brennun v. Owen-CorningFiberglass Corp,, 134
Idaho 800, 801, 10 P.3d 749,750 (2000)(citing Davis v. Moran, 112 Idaho 703,706,735 P.2d
1014,1020 (1987)). This rule applies even though the plaintiff may not be aware of the actual
injury or its cause. Id. at 802, 10 P.3d at 751. The Brennan court further found that the cause of
action accrues and the statute of limitation commences when objective medical proof would
support the existence of an actual injury resulting from asbestos exposure. Id. Thus, if a plaintiff
fails to file suit within two years from the date of first objective medical proof of disease or
injury, his or her claims are barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in IC 5 5-219(4). The
facts that may constitute "objective medical proof that would support the existence of an actual
injury resulting ffom exposure to asbestos," thereby commencing the m i n g of the statute of
limitations include: (1) an examination in order td detect asbestos-related diseases; (2) a chest xray which showed scarring of the lung of a kind that can be seen after asbestos exposure; (3)
changes in the lung consistent with the type of injury and disease that can be seen after asbestos
exposure; or (4) presence of pleural plaques or scarring in the lining of the lung which indicates
asbestos exposure, Id, at 801.
In this case, objective medical proof establishes that the decedents suffered from
asbestos-related injuries more than two years before the complaint was filed. In fact, the
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the claims of the decedents would have been barred had they lived.
For example, Stoor admitted, and the medical records establish, that he was diagnosed with an
asbestos-related disease on or before September 28,2001. (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and
Westinghouse's Statement of Undisputed Facts in Supp, of Mot. for Summ. J. against Stoor
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("Stoor Statement of Undisputed Facts"), Nov. 9,2007, $/I
3-8.) Specifically, a claim for
personal injury arising from asbestos exposure filed in August of 2001 included statements that
"Stoor had been diagnosed with the following asbestos-related injuries: bilateral pleural disease
and nondisabling bilateral interstitial lung disease." (Id. at 73, citations omitted.) Additionally,
on September 28,2001, Dr. Alvin J. Schonfeld read a chest radiograph taken of Stoor on August
24,1991, and "concluded that Stoor had pleural abnormalities consistent with pneumoconiosis
(one form of which is asbestos) and had pleural thickening of the chest wall." (Id. at 7 4,
citations omitted.) Since Stoor did not file his personal injury complaint within two years of
either the 1991 radiograph or the 2001 diagnosis, his claims were time-barred.
Similar to Stoor, Branch had a chest radiograph taken on July 1,2003, which indicated
abnormalities consistent with asbestos and evidence of asbestos exposure. (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand
and Westinghouse's Statement of Undisputed Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. against
Branch C'Branch Statement of Undisputed Facts"), Nov. 9,2007, 77 5-6.) In an emergency room
visit on May 11,2003, Branch also "reported a past medical history of, inter alia, asbestos
exposure horn working at the FMC plant." (Id. at 7 4, citations omitted.) Thus, since Branch did
not did not fde a personal injury complaint relating to an asbestos-related injury within two years
horn the date of objective medical proof of injury, his personal injury claims were also barred by
the statute of limitations.
Likewise, Frasure's medical records establish that there were pleural plaques present
suggesting asbestos disease. After a review of a chest x-ray taken of Frasure on August 24,
2000, Dr. James E. Pearl prepared a report, concluding that "Frasure] does have pleural plaques
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suggesting asbestos disease." (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Statement of
Undisputed Facts in Supp, of Mot. for Sumrn. J. against Frasure ("Frasure Statement of
Undisputed Facts"), Nov. 9,2007,74.) On August 25,2000, another chest x-ray was taken,
showing 'bilateral calcified pleural plaque consistent with asbestos exposure . . . !' (Id. at 15.)
Therefore, since Frasure also failed to file an actionable claim, his negligence and strict products
liability claims were also barred by the statute of limitations.

2.

Whether the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs' negligence and strict liability
claims are barred by the condition precedent rule.

As mentioned, the Moving Defendants contend that because the decedents' claims would
have been barred pursuant to IC 5 5-219(4), the negligence and strict liability claims of the
Wrongfd Death Plaintiffs are also barred. The Moving Defendants argue that "a condition
precedent to pursuing a claim for wrongful death is that the decedent must have been able to
maintain a cause of action had he lived." (Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. for S m . J. against Wrongll Death Pls. at 11.) In support of that argument, the
Plaintiffs rely heavily on a case decided in the United States District Court for the District of
Idaho. That court, in applying Idaho law to an asbestos wrongful death case, determined that the
condition precedent rule does apply in the statute of limitations context. Adams v. Armstrong

Worldlndus., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 1407,1412,1414 @. Idaho 1984), rev'd on other groundssub

nom. Waters v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 248 (9'h Cir. 1985). However, it is
important to note that, in making that determination, the Adams court also conceded that "[tlhe
Idaho Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the question of whether the heirs may
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maintain a wrongful death action if the deceased, at the date of his death, would have been
barred by the statute of limitations." Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court decided "that, if faced
with the question, the Idaho court would apply the condition precedent rule to the statute of
limitations situation, as it has done in situations involving contributory or comparative
negligence." Id. at 1414.
This Court declines to presuppose how the Idaho Supreme Court would rule. Instead, the
fist step is to tun1 to the relevant statutory language for guidance. "Judicial interpretation of a
statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal words." State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho
387,389,3 P.3d 65,67 (Ct.App. 2000)(citing State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659,978 P.2d
214,219 (1999)). It is well established that where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
constmction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999); Burnight, 132
Idaho at 659,978 P.2d at 219; Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389,3 P.3d at 67. "The language of the
statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning." Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659,978
P.2d at 219. Furthermore, "[ilf the language is clear and unambiguous,

... there is no occasion

for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation." Escobar, 134
Idaho at 389,3 P.3d at 67. However, when a court must engage in statutory construction, it has
the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462,
988 P.2d at 688. "To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and
its legislative history." Id. "It is 'incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation,
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which will not render it a nullity."' State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116,121
(Ct.App. 2001)(citing State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444,447,807 P.2d 1282,1285 (Ct.App. 1991)).

F, 5-311. Suit for wrongful death by or against heirs or personal representatives Damages.
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
(1)
another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain
an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death
of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer,
whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any
other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may
also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or
her personal representatives. In every action under this section, such damages
may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be just.

-

The language of the Wrongful Death Statute is plain and unambiguous. As such, this Court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction.
It is instructive that the act makes no mention and provides no provision for limitations
on wrongfut death actions. Furthermore, a clear reading of the words and considering that the
Idaho Legislature created another statute to address personal injury claims, this Court finds that
the Wrongful Death Statute is an act separate from a personal injury cause of action. In reaching
that conclusion, this Court was influenced by the view expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in
the Chapman case:
[Tlhe law is clear that a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the death of the
injured party, and not before. ... This is so because the cause of action did not accrue to
the decedent. ... The cause of action which accrues to an injured person during his
lifetime is altogether separate from the cause of action accruing to the person's heirs
should he die fiom that injury. ... Therefore, the "occurrence" giving rise to the cause of
action is the decedent's wrongful death, and the statute of limitations must date from that
event.

Memorandum Decision and Order
Re: Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghoz~se'sMotions for Summary gudgmeni
Case No. CV-2006-2474-PI

Chapman v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc,, 105 Idaho 785,78447,673 P.2d 385,386-87 (1983)
(citations omitted). Furthermore, as noted in the Adam case, "It is true that Idaho Code 9 5-311
does not contain the proviso common to most wrongful death statutes allowing the heirs to
maintain an action for wrongful death only 'whenever the wrongful act would have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action if death had not ensued."' 596 F.Supp. at 1413.
Thus, the Wrongful Death Statute is a cause of action distinct and separate from an action
for personal injury. As such, there is no condition precedent bar to the Wrongful Death
Plaintiffs' claim here. Furthermore, the relevant statute of limitations dates from the event of the
decedent's death. The claim in this case was filed on June 2,2006. Stoor died on June 13,2004;
Branch died on July 11,2005; Frasure died on February 17,2006. Therefore, the Plaintiffs filed
their complaint within the relevant time frame. As such, this Court declines to grant the Motion
for Summary Judgment submitted by the Moving Defendants regarding this issue.

b.

Whether this Court should dismiss the remaining causes of action.
Similar to their Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Kronek and Day, the

Moving Defendants are also arguing that Counts Three and Four, including claims of fraud or
fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation and battery should be dismissed. However, in
responding to that motion, the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs only addressed the Moving Defendants'
arguments regarding the issues of pleading fraud with particularity and whether Counts Three
and Four are barred by the condition precedent rule. In referring to their claim of
misrepresentation, the Moving Plaintiffs state: "This claim and the other allegations in Count
Three of Plaintiff's Complaint clearly satisfy Idaho's law requiring misrepresentation to be pled
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with particularity." (Pls.' Resp. to Defs. Ingersoll-Rand and Westinghouse's Mot, for S u m . J.
against Wrongful Death Pls. at 5.) The Wrongful Death Plaintiffs also argue that the allegations
contained in Count Four "satisfy Idaho's law and clearly and unambiguously set forth the claims
upon which Plaintiff relies. Additionally, ... Plaintiffs claims are not barred by the so-called
'condition precedent rule."' (Id. at 6-7.)
1.

Whether the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs pled their claims of fraudulent
misrepresentation with any particularity.

Pursuant to Rule 901) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP), claims of fraud and
misrepresentation must be pled with particularity. That rule states:
Rule 9@). Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind, violation of civil or constitutional
rights.
In all averments of fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or constitutional rights,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake, or violation of civil or constitutional
rights shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.
To prove fkaud, a plaintiff must establish the following elements:

(1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable
reliance; and (9) resultant injury.

Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927,155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
Rule 9(b) requires that "allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give defendants notice of
the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend
against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Silver Valley
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Partners, LLC v. De Motte, No. 06-429-N-ELJ, 2007 WL 28023 15, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept. 24,
2007)(citation omitted). That court further stated:
"[Tlhere is no absolute requirement that where several defendants are sued in connection
with an alleged fraudulent scheme, the complaint must identify false statements made by
each and every defendant. Participation by each conspirator in every detail in the
execution of the conspiracy is unnecessary to establish liability, for each conspirator may
be performing different tasks to bring about the desired result." Swartz v. KPMG LLPL
476 F.3d 756. 765 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted) "On the other hand, Rule 9 6 ) does
not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but requires plaintiffs
to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant ... and inform each
defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud.
In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a
minimum, identify the role of each defendant in the alleged fraudulent scheme." Id. at
765-766 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id.

In this case, the Plaintiffs' Complaint makes the same conclusory misrepresentation
allegations against each of the 65 Defendants, without making any specific allegations that any
representations, false or otherwise, were made by the Moving Defendants. These allegations
amount to general averments and do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b), as the allegations
of fraud here are not specific enough and do not "identify the role of each defendant in the
alleged fraudulent scheme." Thus, Plaintiffs general averments directed at fraud are insufficient
to satisfy the requirements of IRCP 9(b). See Dengler, 141 Idaho at 127,'106 P.3d at 453. As
such, any fraud claims alleged by Plaintiffs in Counts Three and Four should be dismissed for
failure to plead with specificity.

In addition, even if the Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of IRCP 9(b), they have
failed to satisfy their burden pursuant to IRCP 56, as the Plaintiffs have simply cited allegations
included in their complaint and have failed to file any affidavits pertaining to their fraud claims.
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2.

Whether the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the condition
precedent rule.

Based on this Court's prior determination as set forth above, there is no condition
precedent rule since the Wrongful Death Statute is a cause of action distinct and separate from an
action for personal injury. Clearly, the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs also filed their claim within
the relevant time frame. As such, the claims of the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs are not dismissed
for failure to satisfy the statute of limitations.
3.

Whether the Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of IRCP 56.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs' failure to present any evidence or argument in opposition to the
Defendants' other arguments is also viewed by this Court not only as a concession of those
points, but as a further violation of Rule 56. As explained previously, Idaho law provides that a
party against whom summary judgment is sought maynot merely rest on the allegations
contained in the complaint, but must come forward with evidence to contradict the assertions of
the moving party in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the Plaintiffs have
failed to produce any affidavits regarding their claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment,
misrepresentation a d o r battery setting forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial", these claims must be dismissed pursuant to the IRCP 56.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby GRANTS the Moving Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment in part and DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment in part.
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Specifically, this Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment against all of the
above-named Plaintiffs as to Counts Three and Four, including the claims of misrepresentation,
battery, fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy. This Court determined that the Plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the requirements of IRCP 9(b), as the allegations of fraud were not specific
enough. Furthermore, summary judgment as to those issues is appropriate because the Plaintiffs
also failed to satisfy the requirements of IRCP 56. Pursuant to that ide, the party opposing a
motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." The Plaintiffs offered nothing
more than mere allegations and provided no evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial regarding those claims.
In addition, this Court also hereby GRANTS the Motion for S m a r y Judgment as to the
negligence and strict liability claims submitted by Plaintiffs Hronelc and Day. Objective medical
proof established that both Plaintiff Hronek and Plaintiff Day suffered from asbestos-related
injuries more than two years before their complaint was filed in this case on June 2,2006.
Therefore, their negligence and strict products liability claims are barred by the statute of
limitations requirement contained in IC 5 5-21 9(4). However, the Moving Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment as against the Wrongful Death Plaintiffs is hereby DENIED. Because
the Wrongful Death Statute is a cause of action distinct and separate from an action for personal
injury, there is no condition precedent bar to the claim submitted by the Wrongful Death
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Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the relevant statute of limitations dates from the event of the decedent's
death, and the claim in this case was filed within the relevant time kame.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
~ a t e this
d

sy

of January, 2008.

PETER D. MCDERMOTT
DISTRICT JUDGE
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